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Duties of Preservation 
DONALD H. REGAN 
I .  THE PROBLEM 
The central philosophical problem concerning our duties with regard to 
nature is this : We are strongly inclined to think we have certain duties 
which are not fully accounted for by instrumental arguments. We are 
also strongly inclined to hold a view about value that seems to make it  
impossible to account for these duties by any noninstrumental arguments. 
Hence our perplexity. 
It seems that we have duties to respect living creatures; to avoid causing 
the extinction of species; even to preserve complex parts of the environ­
ment such as a tropical rain forest or the Grand Canyon. If we ask how 
we can account for these duties (which for convenience I shall refer to 
collectively as duties of preservation), one possibility is to list the benefits 
that accrue to us from acknowledging them. There are powerful instru­
mental arguments for preserving tropical rain forests, which are central 
to the whole planetary ecology. There are colorable arguments for the 
general preservation of species, since currently obscure species can turn 
out to yield new drugs or new genetic material for agricultural exploi­
tation. There are more sophisticated arguments of potentially unlimited 
application based on "aesthetic utility"-we should preserve particular 
natural features or particular species because they embody qualities we 
value or because we find them pleasing. Instrumental arguments like these 
are numerous, varied, and significant, but they do not satisfy us entirely. 
They entail the consequence that if a species is not ecologically essential, 
and if it will produce no wonder drug or wonder crop, then whether we 
have a duty to preserve it depends on whether we like it. The content of 
our duties of preservation will depend heavily on accidental features of 
human preferences. This seems wrong. Analogously, even in the case of 
the tropical rain forest, whose present "economic" utility is not in doubt, 
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it seems wrong to claim we should preserve it merely because it is essential 
to our carrying on our lives and pursuing our goals and satisfactions, 
whatever they may be. The day may come when we can abandon this 
planet and dispense with the rain forest. We do not believe, however, 
that on that day it will become a matter of moral indifference whether 
we destroy the forest. Our duties of preservation demand a more solid 
foundation than our own changeable needs and fancies. 
On the other hand, suppose we try to account for duties of preservation 
without such instrumental arguments. It seems we must claim the natural 
world is valuable in itself. Unfortunately, that claim conflicts with another 
common intuition, that the existence of value depends somehow on the 
existence of fairly sophisticated consciousness. If we imagine a universe 
in which there is no life form higher than the nematode, and if we ask 
whether it is better for that universe to exist than for there to be nothing 
at all, many of us would be inclined to say that it is not better-between 
the existence and the nonexistence of such a universe, there is nothing 
to choose.1 I do not say at this point that the existence of value depends 
on the existence of human beings. If value depends somehow on con­
sciousness, then it remains to be determined what level and type of 
consciousness is required and whether we are the only creatures that 
possess it. But these questions are not crucial here. Our duties of pres­
ervation seem to extend to natural entities that plainly do not have 
conscious lives of their own of any sophistication-the nematode, the 
lousewort, the Grand Canyon. It is hard to see how we can explain the 
duties of preservation in a noninstrumental fashion without claiming 
these entities are valuable in themselves and thereby contradicting the 
intuition that value and consciousness go together.2 
I I .  ON N OT A V O I D ING THE PROBLEM 
The problem, then, is to give a noninstrumental account of our duties 
of preservation without denying the connection between value and con­
sciousness. We could, of course, avoid the problem without solving it. 
We could deny the supposed duties of preservation, or we could grant 
intrinsic value to entities which lack consciousness. I propose to solve 
the problem, not avoid it. However, my solution may seem so implausible 
as to suggest that one of the courses of avoidance must be preferable. I 
therefore want to say something against each of the courses of avoidance. 
It will make for the smoothest exposition (even though it will upset the 
symmetry of the presentation) if I say a bit more now about the connection 
between value and consciousness and put off until much later my reasons 
for not simply denying duties of preservation. 
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With regard to value and consciousness, I propose to look briefly at 
three standard attempts to explain duties of preservation and to show 
that while none of them is satisfactory, each of them achieves what 
p lausibility it has by arguing in a way which tends to impute conscious­
ness where it does not exist. The lesson is that hardly anyone is willing 
to face the claim that value depends on consciousness and deny it outright. 
(1) It is often said that a variety of nonhuman entities-animals, plants, 
rivers, the "biotic community"-have rights. That such claims should be 
made was inevitable; "rights" have become the philosophers' stone of 
modern moral discourse. Unfortunately, we have no satisfactory under­
standing of what we mean even by claims that humans, the paradigmatic 
right-holders, have rights. It is this basic lack of clear understanding that 
encourages claims about nonhuman rights. 
It often seems that claims about Jones's rights are merely disguised 
claims about other people's duties regarding Jones.3 If talk about rights 
is merely disguised talk about duties, then rights cannot be the basis for 
duties. This is as true of duties regarding nature as of duties regarding 
humans. On the other hand, if we try to find a notion of rights that has 
enough substance to be a genuine basis for duties, we are driven to 
thinking about rights as protections of some sort for the activities of 
rational, moral agents. It is clear that few or no nonhuman entities have 
rights of this sort. 
What I have said makes it clear that talk of nonhuman rights serves 
no useful purpose, except perhaps in rare cases. Such talk survives because 
our fuzzy-mindedness about the nature of rights allows assertions about 
rights to seem significant when they are not, when they are mere covers 
for assertions about duties. The seeming significance depends on the 
suggestion, easily recognized as false in the case of almost all nonhumans 
once it is made explicit, that the supposed right-holder is a rational, 
moral agent. 
(2) It is often said that we have duties to every living creature because 
every living creature has "a good of its own."4 This argument does noth­
ing to explain any duties we might have to inanimate nature. Beyond 
that, the argument gets a good deal of its apparent force by inviting 
confusion. 
Consider an oak tree. If someone who says that an oak tree has a good 
of its own is pressed to j ustify that claim, he will usually respond by 
pointing out that an oak tree is a complicated, self-regulating, self-sus­
taining system. Now, if that is what it means to say that an oak tree has 
a good of its own, I agree that an oak tree does have a good of its own. 
But why does it follow that I have any moral duty regarding the oak 
tree? The claim must be that, other things being equal, I should not 
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interfere with complicated, self-regulating, self-sustaining systems. As it 
happens, I think this claim has some plausibility, for reasons that will 
become clear further on. Even so, this claim is no place to end the 
argument for duties regarding nature. It is at most a suggestive place to 
begin. 
The real problem with saying that an oak tree has "a good of its own" 
is that it leads us almost inevitably to think of the oak tree as engaged 
in conscious valuation and in conscious striving after the "good" it has 
chosen or acknowledged. Hardly anyone would make such claims about 
the oak tree outright. But there are considerable illicit benefits (from the 
point of view of one trying to j ustify duties regarding the oak tree) from 
having these ideas in the air. Thinking of the oak tree as a valuer helps 
us over our worry about how there can be value in nature considered 
totally apart from human beings (or rational consciousness) .  We can 
concede that the existence of value requires a valuer, but we can let the 
oak tree fill that role. The idea is that each living thing creates the value 
in its own life by valuing it. Also, we readily think we should not try to 
impose our views of the good on other people; each person has a right 
to "a good of his own" which others should respect. If so, and if an oak 
tree has a good of its own, then it seems we should respect that too. 
These benefits are, as I said, illicit. The oak does not engage in conscious 
valuation. If we think it important that an oak tree is a complicated, self­
regulating, self-sustaining system, let us say that about the oak tree and 
then argue about why it matters. Let us avoid specious shortcuts. (What 
I have said in this section applies mutatis mutandis to claims that every 
living creature has "interests," or that every living creature is a center of 
a respect-demanding "will.") 
(3) It is often said that we are members of a "global community" which 
includes, in addition to ourselves, all other living creatures from chim­
panzees to blue-green algae, and it is said that we have duties to the other 
members of this community just as each of us has duties to other members 
of the human community.5 However, "community"-in the only sense 
in which it can possibly have any moral significance-requires at least 
the potential for shared beliefs and values. The universe of living creatures 
simply does not amount to a community in any morally relevant sense. 
The "global community" usually turns out to be a metaphor for the 
fact that all life is part of a complex ecological web. We are dependent 
on many other species; and almost every other species (perhaps absolutely 
every other species) is dependent on us in the sense that we could destroy 
it if we tried. What follows from these facts ? Nothing of interest. Our 
power to affect other species may be a necessary condition for our having 
duties regarding them; but the mere fact of our having this power does 
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not tell us what duties we have, if any, in the use of it. Similarly, our 
dependence on other species means that if we do too much damage to 
other living things we are likely to end up hurting ourselves as well; but 
any argument from this premise will make our duties regarding nature 
instrumental, which is just what the argument from global community 
was meant to avoid. 
Ill. THE S O LUTI ON 
It is time now to introduce my own solution to the problem of justifying 
noninstrumental duties of preservation without denying the connection 
between value and consciousness. I shall borrow an idea from G. E. 
Moore. The idea is best introduced by considering a specific example. 
There is a natural "object" which is the Grand Canyon. Many people 
know of the existence of the Grand Canyon and have some specific 
knowledge of it. Consider a person Jones, who has some knowledge of 
the Grand Canyon and who also takes pleasure in that knowledge. 
Moore's idea is that we should regard as intrinsically valuable the com­
plex consisting of the Grand Canyon, plus Jones's knowledge of the 
Grand Canyon, plus Jones's pleasure in her knowledge of it. 
It must be emphasized that what is valuable here comprises three 
things-the Grand Canyon, Jones's knowledge, and Jones's pleasure in 
her knowledge of the Canyon-when they occur together. The valuable 
entity is what Moore called an "organic unity." The claim that this unity 
is valuable does not, at least on the face of it, entail that any individual 
element is valuable on its own. In particular, it does not entail either that 
the Canyon is valuable on its own or that Jones's pleasure is valuable 
on its own.6 
The phrase "Jones's pleasure in her knowledge of the Canyon," which 
I have used to describe one element of the valuable complex, may be 
misleading. It suggests that Jones's pleasure is in her knowledge alone, 
and not in the Canyon. It suggests that Jones is glad to know about the 
Canyon, given that it is there, because she likes knowing about what is 
there, but that she is otherwise indifferent to the existence of the Canyon. 
That is not the state of mind I want Jones to have. I want Jones to take 
pleasure in the existence of the Canyon itself. Why, then, do I not use 
the phrase "Jones's pleasure in the existence of the Canyon" ?  Because 
that also may be misleading. This latest phrase suggests that, so long as 
Jones knows there is a Grand Canyon, and is glad of that, it does not 
matter whether Jones knows or cares to know anything more about the 
Canyon. On my view, however, Jones ought to want to know as much 
about the Canyon as possible; and she ought to take greater pleasure in 
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knowing it more completely; and the more she knows the more valuable 
is the complex under discussion. Perhaps, then, we should speak of 
"Jones's pleasure in the existence of the Canyon and in her knowledge 
of it." This is an improvement, but it still could be taken to refer to two 
separable pleasures in two separate things, the Canyon, and Jones's 
knowledge of it. The misleading suggestions of the previous inadequate 
phrasings are not suppressed entirely. Perhaps the best description of 
Jones's state of mind would be "Jones's pleasure in the Canyon as known 
to her." The only trouble with this is that it sounds rather artificial. We 
would hardly know what it meant if it did not come at the end of a 
paragraph of hair-splitting. Hereafter I shall use all the phrases I have 
discussed indiscriminately. I shall always mean by them what I would 
mean by "Jones's pleasure in the Canyon as known to her"-that is, a 
pleasure in the Canyon and in Jones's knowledge of it as an inseparable 
whole, and a pleasure which would be magnified by greater knowledge. 
So far I have described one thing, a complex involving the Grand 
Can yon and Jones, which I have claimed is intrinsically valuable. Shortly 
I shall give a recipe for constructing enormous numbers of valuable 
complexes along the same lines. First, however, let me say a bit about 
what it means to call something "intrinsically valuable." 
To say something is intrinsically valuab le is to say that it is good in 
itself, abstracting from its causal antecedents or consequences, and ab­
stracting from its relationships to other things. It is good just for what 
it is. A universe which contains it  is the better for containing it (still 
abstracting from causes, consequences, and external relationships) .  
If something is intrinsically valuable, then any moral agent has a moral 
reason to try to bring it into existence or to preserve it if it exists already. 
Of course, to say a moral agent "has a moral reason" to promote the 
existence of something is not to specify the strength of that reason; and 
it is not to say that the agent has a conclusive moral reason. Two things 
may both be intrinsically valuable, and yet one may be more valuable 
than the other. If we must choose between the existence of two valuable 
things, of different value, we have "a reason" to promote the existence 
of each, but we have the stronger reason, and thus the conclusive reason, 
other things being equal, to prefer the existence of the more valuable. 
Similarly, something may be intrinsically valuable and also be instru­
mentally valuable or instrumentally disvaluable. (Of course, this instru­
mental value or disvalue must ultimately depend on the intrinsic value 
or disvalue of something else. ) We may have a conclusive reason, all 
things considered, to avoid creating or even to destroy some complex of 
great intrinsic value, if  its existence has sufficiently bad consequences. 
All of this is elementary; but people sometimes assume that if a thing 
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has intrinsic value it must have "absolute value" (either infinite value or 
value that for some other reason cannot be weighed against competing 
values) ,  or else they assume that if a thing has intrinsic value it cannot 
have instrumental value or disvalue as well. These are misconceptions. 
How does one go about showing that something has intrinsic value? 
One does it in exactly the same way one demonstrates any other fun­
damental moral proposition, however that is. I do not claim to know 
how that is. I do claim that the widespread belief that propositions about 
the good are harder to demonstrate than propositions about rights and 
duties is the merest prejudice. For the present what we can do is to expose 
and avoid outright confusions; to consult our moral intuitions; and to 
see which intuitions (at all levels of particularity or generality) figure in 
the most coherent moral theory we can come up with. 
Very well, what other complexes, constructed on the model of the 
Grand Canyon-Jones complex, are intrinsically valuable? Clearly, if we 
replace Jones by any other human being, the resulting complex will still 
be valuable if the original one is. Indeed, if we replace Jones by any other 
conscious agent capable of having the same sort of knowledge of the 
Canyon and taking the same sort of pleasure in it as Jones does, the 
resulting complex will still be valuable. The interesting question is what 
we can put in the place of the Grand Canyon. I do not suggest that we 
can put in the place of the Grand Canyon anything at all which we can 
refer to with a definite description. I would not, for example, claim that 
the complex consisting of Smith's cruelty, plus Jones's knowledge of 
Smith's cruelty, plus Jones's pleasure in her knowledge of Smith's cruelty, 
is intrinsically valuable. 
On the other hand, I suggest that we can put in the place of the Grand 
Canyon any "natural object." "Object" here is to be construed broadly, 
as including anything we can refer to with a definite description. Thus, 
natural objects include individual creatures, species, individual ecosys­
tems, types of ecosystems, geological formations, and natural processes 
(everything from " the way prokaryotes exchange energy with their en­
vironment" to "the way continents have been created and destroyed by 
plate tectonics").  Pions and muons are natural objects, and so is the 
process of heavy-element formation in stars. In saying that all these things 
are natural objects, I do not mean to be making any controversial meta­
physical claim. I am saying only that every one of these things can be 
part of an intrinsically valuable complex if it is conjoined with some 
human being's knowledge of it and that human being's pleasure in her 
knowledge. (I shall speak for now as if the only relevant knowers are 
human beings.) 
With Moore's idea, as I have elaborated it, in hand, we have the 
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materials for an argument for the preservation of any natural object. Any 
natural object can be part of a valuable complex if we know the object 
and take pleasure in our knowledge. As to any such complex, we have 
a reason to promote its existence. If the existence of the object is essential 
to the existence of the complex, then we have a reason to promote the 
existence of the object. So we have a reason to preserve any natural object 
that currently exists. 
Now, consider some particular natural object. Someone might say: 
"Unless we know the object and take pleasure in our knowledge, the 
object's mere existence is not valuable. Therefore our having a reason to 
preserve the object depends on our knowing it and taking pleasure in it. 
We have no reason to preserve an object we do not know, or that we 
take no pleasure in. So what we should preserve depends on what we 
like, and we are back where we started." This is not correct. It is true 
that if our ignorance of the object, or our lack of pleasure in it, were an 
immutable feature of the universe, then we would have no reason to 
preserve the object in question. But we are capable of learning about the 
object; and I believe we are capable of learning to take pleasure in knowl­
edge of any natural object. If that is so, then we have reason to preserve 
any natural object, just as I said. With regard to objects we already know 
about and take pleasure in, it is enough to preserve them. With regard 
to objects we do not know or take pleasure in, we have reason to preserve 
them, and to study them, and to learn to enjoy our knowledge of them. 
(Even as to objects we already know something about and enjoy knowing 
about, there is probably a lways more we might know. If, as I assume, 
fuller knowledge makes a more valuable complex, then we have reason 
to study these objects as well.) 
Observe what my argument, if we can accept it, accomplishes. It gives 
us a noninstrumental argument for the preservation of natural objects, 
without denying the intuition that the existence of value depends some­
how on consciousness. Both of these points bear spelling out. 
IV.  ON NoN I NSTRUMENTALITY 
The main thing I mean when I say the present argument is "noninstru­
mental" is this: On the present argument it is not the case that we have 
reason to preserve a natural object only if it is economically useful or if 
we happen to like it. We have reason to preserve every natural object; 
those we do not currently have knowledge of or take pleasure in, we 
ought to learn about and learn to take pleasure in.  It is  true that our 
having reason to preserve every natural object depends on the fact that 
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we have at least the potential for knowing about and taking pleasure in 
it. But that is a potential we have and which, on the present argument, 
we ought to develop. The argument for preservation does not disappear 
just because we decide to ignore that potential. Nor is it necessarily 
overridden if it turris out that we could satisfy more of our preferences 
overall by ignoring that potential. Satisfying our preferences is not all 
that morality is about. The central objection to traditional instrumental 
arguments for preservation is that they make the case for preservation 
depend on accidental or arbitrary facts about our needs and preferences. 
The present argument depends on only one deep fact about us, which, 
while it could be otherwise, seems too fundamental to be regarded as 
accidental or arbitrary. The fact that we are able to take p leasure in the 
knowledge of any natural object is not at all similar to the fact that most 
of us like butterflies and do not like slugs. 
The present argument is also noninstrumental in the sense that it does 
not make preservation a means to maximizing "the good for man." The 
good to be maximized is one in which human beings figure essentially 
(assuming we are the only sufficiently sophisticated consciousnesses in 
the universe) . The good complexes I have described cannot exist without 
certain facts being true of certain humans. But these complexes are not 
good because they are "good for" the humans involved. 
It might seem that my argument is instrumental in the sense that the 
existence of any natural object is valuable only because it is necessary to 
something else, namely, the existence of various complexes of the sort I 
have described. This suggestion rests on a confusion about the nature of 
instrumental value. It is true that the existence of a natural object is 
valuable only as part of one of my complexes. But that is not to say that 
its value is merely instrumental. Its value does not lie in its consequences; 
it is not valuable because it causes something else. The complex which 
is valuable is different from the object alone; but the object is an essential 
part of it. The relationship between the object and what is valuable in 
itself is a logical relationship, and not a merely causal one. (I should 
perhaps point out that the object may have instrumental value, even with 
respect to a complex in which it figures. The object must exist before it 
can be known. Its existence at one time may have as a causal consequence 
its existing and being known at a later time. So its existence at the earlier 
time may be instrumental to the existence of the valuable complex at the 
later time. It remains true that the value of the object is not merely 
instrumental, since the object figures essentially in the valuable complex 
realized at the later time.) 
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v. ON VALUE AND C O NSCI OUSNESS 
I have spelled out the point that my argument for preservation is not 
instrumental. Let me say a word about the point that it is consistent with 
our intuition about the relation between value and consciousness. Some­
one who says that the existence -0f value depends on consciousness may 
mean two quite different things. He may mean, " No proposition about 
value is true except in virtue of being believed by some conscious being." 
Alternatively, he may mean, "Nothing has positive or negative value 
unless it  somehow involves consciousness." The first claim is metaethical: 
it is about truth-conditions for moral claims, and it entails subjectivism 
of some sort. The second claim is normative: it is about what sort of 
thing in fact has value, and it is consistent with objectivism. The simplest 
way to see the difference between these claims may be to imagine a 
universe devoid of consciousness. The proponent of the first claim might 
well say about that universe that it has "no value" in the sense that no 
attribution to it of any particular degree of value is true. Because the 
universe is devoid of consciousness, the question of its value simply 
cannot arise. (The proponent of the first claim need not say this, but it 
is something he could say.) The proponent of the second claim, in con­
trast, would say that the universe without consciousness has a quite 
definite value, namely zero. 
The claim I am presently interested in is the second, normative, claim. 
It is the second claim that, in the opening paragraphs of this essay, seemed 
to stand in the way of explaining our duties of preservation by nonin­
strumental arguments. But it is clear that my Moorean argument for 
preservation is perfectly consistent with the intuition that nothing has 
value unless it somehow involves consciousness. The only things that I 
have asserted are valuable do involve consciousness. The consistency of 
my view with the claim that value requires consciousness is obvious, once 
we are clear about what version of that claim creates the difficulty. 
V I .  OBJECTI O NS AND C OMPLI CATI O NS 
I have said that a natural object such as the Grand Canyon is not valuable 
in itself, but that it is good for the Canyon to exist and for us to know 
about it and take pleasure in our knowledge. Someone might object that 
this position is incoherent. How can it possibly be a good thing for us 
to know about the Canyon and take pleasure in it unless the Canyon is 
worth knowing about and taking pleasure in ? In short, does not my view, 
that a certain sort of complex involving the Canyon is good, presuppose 
that the Canyon is good in itself?7 
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I concede that on my view the Canyon must be, in some sense, "worth" 
knowing about and taking pleasure in. It does not follow, however, that 
the Canyon must be valuable in itself. Rather, to say the Canyon is worth 
knowing about is to say precisely that complexes involving the Canyon 
and someone's knowledge of it and pleasure in it are good. To say this 
is to assert something about the Canyon which is not tautological or 
trivial. As I have already pointed out, there are things (such as "Smith's 
cruelty") which do not generate good complexes when someone knows 
about them and takes pleasure in them. So, the claim that the Canyon 
is worth knowing about is a significant claim even though it does not 
entail that the Canyon is valuable in itself.8 
The hypothetical objector may not be satisfied. How do I know that 
the complex involving the Grand Canyon is good and the analogous 
complex involving Smith's cruelty is bad? Must not there be something 
about the Grand Canyon (itself) and Smith's cruelty (itself) that accounts 
for this difference? What could it be except that the Canyon is good in 
itself and Smith's cruelty is bad in itself? A complete answer to this 
question would take us far beyond the present essay. The short answer 
is this. There is a difference between the Canyon and Smith's cruelty, 
and it is a difference in intrinsic value. But the difference is that while 
Smith's cruelty is bad in itself, the Canyon has zero value in itself. (Note 
that Smith's cruelty can be bad in itself without violating the principle 
that value requires consciousness, since Smith's cruelty is itself a feature 
of a certain consciousness.) As to things, like Smith's cruelty, that are 
good or bad in themselves, it is good to know them and take pleasure 
in them if they are good, bad to know them and take pleasure in them 
if they are bad. (It is not the knowledge but the taking pleasure that 
makes the complex bad when the thing is bad in itself.) As to things, like 
the Canyon, that are neither good nor bad in themselves, knowing them 
and taking pleasure in them is good. There is an asymmetry in this 
position. But that, so far as I can now make out, is the way it is. 
A different objection to my claim that the Grand Canyon has no value 
on its own depends on the well-known "last person" argument.9 Suppose 
Jones is the last person on earth. She knows there will be no one after 
her. As she dies, she can push a button which detonates a cataclysmic 
explosion and destroys the Grand Canyon. Would it be wrong for her 
to push the button ? Many people are inclined to think it would be wrong; 
and they also think that the wrongness of pushing the button can only 
b e  accounted for by granting the Canyon value in itself. After all (the 
argument goes) ,  once Jones is dead, the universe is empty of conscious­
ness. If consciousness is essential to value, then there is zero value, 
whether the Canyon is still there or not. If it makes no difference to the 
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value of the universe whether the Canyon exists after Jones dies, she can 
hardly do wrong by destroying it in the moment of her death. 
My own view is that it would be wrong for Jones to destroy the Canyon, 
but that we can account for this consistently with my theory. There are 
two different points to be made, both of them important. First, assuming 
Jones destroys the Canyon, why does she do it? We could describe  a 
variety of possible motivations, which differ subtly, but there must be  a 
common element of sheer wanton destructiveness. Jones wants the Can­
yon not to exist. But that desire is inconsistent with Jones 's knowing of 
the existence of the Canyon and taking pleasure in it. If Jones has the 
proper attitude toward the Canyon (that is, the attitude which would 
figure in a valuable complex involving the Canyon and herself) ,  she will 
not destroy the Canyon. Conversely, if she does destroy the Canyon, she 
has the wrong attitude, and that is what is wrong in the situation. It is 
true that on this analysis her act of destruction is wrong only derivatively. 
The act is wrong because it manifests a wrong attitude, while the attitude 
would be wrong whether the act were done or not. Still, it is the act that 
manifests the attitude to us, so it is natural that we should locate the 
wrongness in the act, at least on first consideration. (Someone might ask 
us to imagine that Jones does take pleasure in the existence of the Canyon, 
so long as she exists, but that she is saddened by the thought of the 
Canyon surviving her. She wants to affirm her intimacy with it by "taking 
it with her." I do not find this psychologically plausible. If it were plau­
sible, then perhaps we should say that Jones was extemely peculiar, but 
in such a way as to make her apparently wrong act arguably innocent.) 
My second point about the "last person" argument avoids any psy­
chological claims, but raises other complications. The argument that it 
does not matter whether the Canyon exists after Jones's death assumes 
that the Canyon's existence can only be valuable as part of a complex 
involving contemporaneous knowledge by some consciousness. Is it not 
possible, however, that the value of the universe could be increased by 
the Canyon's existence after Jones's death, combined with Jones's knowl­
edge (before her death) that the Canyon will continue to exist and her 
pleasure in that knowledge? When I first described the sort of complex 
we have been discussing, I ignored this matter of timing, and I must admit 
that it raises many questions I find perplexing. But we plainly cannot 
insist on contemporaneous consciousness in every case. Consider human 
knowledge of dinosaurs. No dinosaur was ever known by a contemporary 
human consciousness, but it is good that dinosaurs should have existed 
and that humans now should know about them and take pleasure in that 
knowledge. If there is good to be achieved by knowledge of what came 
before the first human, why not also by knowledge of what comes after 
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the last one? But if there is good to be achieved by knowledge of what 
comes after the last human, then Jones, in destroying the Grand Canyon, 
destroys an opportunity for good.10 
Now we have a new problem. I have said that our knowledge of 
dinosaurs is valuable even though dinosaurs no longer exist. That might 
seem to affect the nature of our obligation to preserve species that do 
exist. Imagine that there is some species about which we know everything 
there is to know. Is there really any reason to preserve that species? We 
will not learn more about it if it continues to exist. If it ceases to exist, 
we can remember it. We can continue to know "how it was" and to take 
pleasure in our knowledge. What difference does it make whether the 
species is still around? 
Although I think it is not a matter of indifference whether the species 
continues to exist, I should admit that in one respect the case for pres­
ervation is weakened by our complete knowledge of the species. If we 
find ourselves in circumstances where we must choose between two sim­
ilar species-where both are endangered but only one can be saved-we 
have reason to save the species about which we know less in order that, 
after study, we may eventually end up with the greatest aggregate knowl­
edge of the two species. 
Going back to the case where there is just one species which we know 
completely, why is it desirable that that species continue to exist? One 
point, of course, is that its continued existence may be  important instru­
mentally to our continuing knowledge of its past existence and pleasure 
in that knowledge. This argument disappears, however, if we assume that 
our memory simply will not fade. Another tempting suggestion is this: 
The species cannot be completely known if it ceases to exist, since if it 
continues to exist it will evolve and will have a future development that 
we cannot predict. Therefore the question why it is good for a completely 
known species to continue to exist cannot properly arise. This may be  
the right answer, but i t  raises complications. What are the criteria for 
identity of a species over time? If the species evolves, is it the same species? 
If it gives rise to a different species, then the consequence of continuing 
its existence past the present is not that it will continue to exist and be 
known by us, but that something new will come into existence which 
we can know. Our knowing that new thing would, on my view, be a 
source of value; but if the present species ceases to exist for some reason 
other than self-annihilation by evolution, then presumably different new 
things will come into existence for us to know. It is not immediately 
obvious which possible set of new things would, if known, generate 
complexes of greater intrinsic value. 
For the present, I am inclined to rest simply on an intuition that it is 
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better, other things being equal, for something to exist and be known 
than for it not to exist and (though nonexistent) be known. Many phi­
losophers have had the intuition, in one form or another, that existence 
is good. I have rejected the claim that the mere existence of entities 
without consciousness is a good. But that rejection is perfectly consistent 
with the suggestion, which I would expect to be widely accepted and 
which reflects the intuition that existence is better than nonexistence, 
that existing-and-being-known is better than non-existing-and-(nonethe­
less)-being-known. 
We should also remember that the question "What difference does it 
make whether the perfectly known species continues to exist?" will arise 
in some context. Insofar as we are called upon to make a choice, our 
choice can be expected to manifest our attitude toward the species, just 
as Jones 's choice about the Grand Canyon manifested her attitude. If we 
now take pleasure in our knowledge of the species, we will not be able 
to regard it as a matter of indifference whether the species continues to 
exist. We may decline to save it, or we may even eliminate it, for adequate 
cause. But we will not let it go or eliminate it for no reason at all. 
VII .  S OME APPLI CATIONS 
So far I have been engaged in general exposition of my theory. It may 
clarify how the theory works if we look at some examples. 
(1) Consider a case where we must choose between protecting two 
individuals of some common species and protecting the last two (mating) 
individuals of a similar but rare species. Most of us would think it better 
to protect the rare individuals. Theories based on the "rights" or " in­
terests" of individual living creatures cannot account for this intuition. 1 1  
My theory, however, accounts for it  very simply. Whichever pair of 
individuals we protect, we save two individuals (whose existence we know 
of and take pleasure in) . That is good. But if we protect the rare indi­
viduals, and only if we protect them, we also save a species which would 
otherwise disappear. Because the species is a separate "natural object," 
saving the species is a separate good. What I have just said may seem 
too simple to be an argument. I have hardly done more than restate the 
obvious basis for our intuition that we should save the rare individuals. 
The point is that my theory, on which every natural object is potentially 
valuable, and valuable in essentially the same way though not necessarily 
to the same degree, provides a natural home for our intuition. Competing 
theories do not. 
(2) Consider a case where we must decide whether or not to prevent 
the extinction of a species which seems to be disappearing in the natural 
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course of events and not because of human intervention. Even people 
who feel strongly that we should not cause extinctions are likely to feel 
that allowing an extinction to occur (not preventing it when prevention 
is in our power) is quite a different thing. This obviously cannot be  
explained by  a theory which assigns value only to species as  such. On 
my view, the difference between causing an  extinction and allowing an 
extinction is explained by the fact that natural processes are potentially 
valuable natural objects just as species are. Where we cause an extinction, 
we are destroying both the species and its natural "trajectory." If we 
prevent an extinction, we are saving a species (which is good) ,  but we 
are interfering with a natural process. It does not follow from this that 
we should always allow extinctions. There is a choice to be made. But 
when the issue is whether to allow an extinction, as opposed to whether 
to cause an extinction, there are considerations on both sides. 
(3) A similar question is whether we should interfere in a particular 
case to save an animal about to be eaten by a predator. On any theory 
which confines its attention to individuals, it is hard to see why we may 
not choose either way. The same is true even on a theory that values 
species, if the choice we are considering arises in only a small number 
of cases. However, many people would think that, barring special cir­
cumstances, we probably should not intervene. This again is easily ex­
plained if we grant value (by which I always mean potential value as part 
of an appropriate complex) to the natural processes of predator-prey 
interaction. 
(4) A rather different question is whether we should preserve things 
which are dangerous, such as the smallpox virus or rats, or things which 
are generally thought ugly, like banana slugs. My theory says that we 
have reason to preserve the smallpox virus and that the reason is of the 
same type as the reason for preserving, say, butterflies. But if the con­
sequential costs of preserving the smallpox virus are too great, then on 
balance we should extinguish it. Calculating the consequences and strik­
ing the balance may be very complicated. But the fact that the smallpox 
virus is dangerous to people does not mean it is not worth knowing about 
or that we may not take pleasure in knowing about it. No more does 
the "sliminess" of the slug make it unworthy. "All God's creatures" are 
worth our attention. 
(5) Sometimes we have to destroy something, like a laboratory animal 
or the natural operation of some natural process over a particular stretch 
of time, in order to increase our knowledge of the thing we destroy or 
of similar things. On my view, this destruction may be j ustified. The value 
of our knowledge of and pleasure in anything is increased if the know!-
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edge increases. In some cases, then, the destruction, which should always 
be cause for regret, will produce adequate compensating benefits. 
(6) There has been discussion of whether we should focus our efforts 
at preservation on rare species or on rare ecosystems.12 There is even the 
suggestion that protecting species and protecting ecosystems will come 
to the same thing in practice. Although I agree with much of what is said 
about this, I would point out that there is a difference in principle between 
protecting species and protecting ecosystems. We can easily imagine an 
ecosystem which contains only common species (and only species com­
mon outside that ecosystem) but which is nonetheless special as an eco­
system because the species interact there in unique ways. Similarly, we 
can imagine a species which is rare, and which inhabits only one eco­
system, but which does not make the ecosystem as such specially inter­
esting because a similar ecological role is played by a similar but more 
common species in many similar ecosystems. Given that there is a dif­
ference between protecting rare species and rare ecosystems, my theory 
says that we should protect both. I think that comports with most people's 
intuitions . 
(7) Finally, what is the value of human-created species? This is an 
unusual question, but a very interesting one. It seems to me that human­
created species must be regarded as human artifacts. Many human ar­
tifacts are valuable in the same general way as natural objects ; but they 
are not valuable in exactly the same way. To explain why not, I must 
add to my theory a point that has not been brought out previously. I 
have not attempted to characterize in full detail the emotion I have 
referred to as our pleasure in the knowledge of various natural objects. 
One aspect of that emotion ought to be pleasure in the knowledge of 
them as natural, as things not of our making. Our relation to the natural 
world is complex. We are rooted in it. We evolved out of it. But also, in 
some sense, we have evolved out of it. Unless we are in some deep way 
different from earthquakes, oak trees, and lemurs, moral philosophy, and 
indeed all philosophy and all science, is an illusion. I do not claim to 
understand just how we are different from earthquakes, oak trees, and 
lemurs; but if  there is such a gulf as I claim between the human world 
and the natural world, that is itself a fact (or an enormous system of 
facts) worth learning about and taking pleasure in. It follows, I think, 
that we should value what is natural in part for being natural. And so, 
of course, we should value what is human in part for being human. 
Everything made by humans (or at least every material thing made by 
humans) has a natural component; and the proportions and mode of 
mixing of the natural and the "human" may vary greatly. I do not mean 
to suggest that a "wild" garden and a freeway interchange are to be  
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valued in exactly the same way because they both show the human hand. 
But the distinction between what is and what is not our creation would 
be crucial to a complete explication (which I cannot here provide) of 
how we should enjoy the world around us.13 
V I I I .  PRIORITIES AMO N G  SPECIES 
I turn now from specific cases to some general remarks on the problem 
of priorities among species. These remarks will also tend to fill out my 
theory. The question is this: If we can preserve only a limited number 
of endangered species, and if we have some choice about which to pre­
serve, how should we decide? Specifically, what makes one species in­
trinsically more valuable than another ? The second question, about in­
trinsic value, is narrower than the first question, about how we should 
decide. I shall focus on the second question, but I should point out what 
I am ignoring, which is questions about the instrumental value and dis­
value of species.14 Species often have substantial instrumental value or 
disvalue. It is likely that in many cases where we must decide what to 
preserve, the instrumental considerations completely swamp considera­
tions relating to the intrinsic value of the species themselves. Of course, 
in principle, we cannot know what the instrumental considerations are 
without having a complete theory of intrinsic value. But a complete theory 
would recognize many forms of intrinsic value not discussed in this essay. 
So, in discussing only the intrinsic value of species, I am dealing with 
only a part, perhaps a very small part, of the problem.15 
It seems that there are two clear general principles. First, more complex 
life forms are more valuable than less complex ones, other things being 
equal. A ferret is more valuable than a centipede, which is more valuable 
than an amoeba. Even an amoeba is enormously complex. Still, there are 
degrees of complexity; and that remains true even if I am wrong about 
my specific rankings. Given that there are degrees of complexity, the 
more complex object is more valuable just because it provides the op­
portunity for more knowledge. There is more to be known about a 
complex object than about a simple one. (To be sure, the possibility of 
the thing being "known" at all depends on its having a certain stable 
internal organization. Complexity is not the same as chaos, and there is 
a sense in which organization is simplicity. But these facts do not seem 
to upset our intuitions about the value of complexity and the reason it 
is valuable.) 
In the preceding paragraph I compared "a ferret" with "a centipede," 
and so on. The original question concerned the value of a species of ferret 
or a species of centipede. Does the value ranking remain the same whether 
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we talk about individuals or species? In general, yes. There may be  some 
exceptions, however. Social insects, for example, exhibit complexities of 
behavior as species that would be unknown to us and possibly undis­
coverable if  we knew these insects only as individuals. So in this case the 
species is relatively more valuable than we might think after considering 
only the (apparent) complexity of individuals . Similarly, certain species 
may play special roles in complex and unusual ecosystems, which makes 
a complete knowledge of them and their systematic role more valuable 
than it would otherwise seem. 
The second clear general principle is that, other things being equal, a 
species is made more valuable by belonging to a sparsely populated genus 
or family or order. Taxonomically isolated species are likely to represent 
unusual modes of adaptation. Their existence increases the diversity of 
nature. That means both that there is more to know about what exists, 
and that a complete knowledge of what exists entails a greater knowledge 
of nature's possibilities. 
Needless to say, the values of complexity and diversity may conflict. 
We might be compelled to choose between a complex species in a richly 
populated genus and a simpler species which has no congeners at all. 
A question that I shall raise without answering is whether a species 
acquires special value by having a role in some human culture. Animals 
figure in our cultural practices in a variety of ways. The bald eagle is the 
national symbol of the United States. Certain Eskimo tribes depend heav­
ily on the bowhead whale. English-speaking children (and many adults 
who were once English-speaking children) may have special feelings about 
rabbits and deer because they were brought up with Peter Rabbit and 
Bambi. And so on. Clearly any of these facts may invest a species with 
special instrumental importance. The question is, do any of these facts 
invest the species with special intrinsic importance? Or rather, since we 
deny intrinsic importance to the species itself, do any of the cultural 
complexes we have indicated have an intrinsic value that is not exhausted 
by the value of the "natural object plus knowledge plus pleasure in the 
knowledge" and in which the species figures essentially? It should be 
apparent why, having raised this question, I cannot answer it here. An 
answer would presuppose a complete theory of the intrinsic value of 
cultural manifestations. We would also need to say more than we have 
said about the special value (if any) of shared knowledge, as opposed to 
knowledge belonging (or considered as belonging) to individual knowers 
only. I suspect that in the end we would conclude that the intrinsic value 
of a species is  increased by its playing a special role in human culture. 
But for now that must remain a conjecture. 
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IX. THE IMPORTANCE OF BEI N G  HUMAN 
For much of this paper I have written as if the valuable complexes under 
discussion must involve, in addition to some natural object, a human 
being who knows the object and takes pleasure in it. Is this concentration 
on human knowers justified? As I have already explained, it is not my 
intention to limit the relevant range of knowers by stipulation. In prin­
ciple, other knowing subjects could fill the role of the human being in 
the complexes I regard as valuable. It just seems to me that in the universe 
as we know it, there are no other subjects who can fill the same role. 
Why not? Obviously, there is both a normative and an empirical prem­
ise. The normative premise specifies just what kind of knowledge and 
pleasure-just what sort of consciousness-is necessary to the goodness 
of one of my complexes. The empirical premise is that there are no other 
subjects in the universe who possess the relevant sort of consciousness. 
I have said the subject whose participation makes a valuable complex 
must know some natural object and take pleasure in it. We cannot deny 
that certain creatures besides ourselves have "knowledge" of some sort 
and experience "pleasure" of some sort. But knowledge and pleasure 
come in many varieties. Although I cannot define precisely the features 
of consciousness that go to make a valuable complex, I can make it clear 
that the consciousness must be relatively sophisticated. 
First, the knowing subject must be self-conscious. He (let me call the 
indefinite and possibly nonhuman subject "he") must be aware of himself 
as something separate from the object of his knowledge. Why is this 
important? Because the subject must take pleasure in the object and in 
his knowledge of the object. The subject who does not distinguish be­
tween himself and the object may feel pleasure as a result of his awareness 
of the object, but it seems that he can hardly take pleasure in the object 
(as such) . Even more clearly, unless he is aware of himself as a knowing 
subject, he is not aware that he has knowledge, and so he cannot take 
pleasure in his knowledge. 
A related point is that the subject must be able to contemplate the 
possibility of the nonexistence of the things he takes pleasure in. To take 
pleasure in something, as opposed to merely getting pleasure from some­
thing, requires that one consciously prefer the existence of what one takes 
pleasure in to its nonexistence, and therefore requires that one be able 
to contemplate its nonexistence. 
If the full range of possible goods from knowledge of and pleasure in 
natural objects is to be achieved, the knowing subject must be capable 
of wide-ranging intellectual apprehension. For example, if the full range 
of possible goods is to be achieved, the subject must be able to appreciate 
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modern physics. This obviously requires an intellectual capacity consid­
erably in excess of day-to-day needs. It also requires the ability to engage 
in complicated symbolic activity. 
Finally, I am inclined to think that the knowing sub ject must at least 
be able to raise the question of what is intrinsically good. Whether this 
is a further required feature of the relevant consciousness or whether 
ability to raise value questions is entailed by the other features I have 
mentioned and briefly argued for (self-consciousness, ability to contem­
plate nonexistence, wide-ranging intellectual apprehension and symbolic 
capacity) is itself an interesting problem. Whatever the answer to that 
problem, however, the reference to ability to raise value questions sug­
gests a useful way of characterizing the required features as a group. 
Even if the first four features are not sufficient to guarantee the ability 
to raise value questions, they seem necessary to that ability. In a sense, 
then, the whole package adds up to the ability to raise value questions. 
This seems eminently reasonable. Remember that what got us started on 
this search was a feeling that the existence of value somehow depends 
on consciousness. If that is so-if we are trying to define the sort of 
consciousness which is essential to the existence of value-then it seems 
fitting that the relevant consciousness should turn out to be one that can 
appreciate value questions. 
As to the empirical question whether humans are the only subjects in 
the universe who have the relevant sort of consciousness, I do not claim 
to know for certain. No one can afford to be too confident today that 
he knows all there is to know about the intellectual life of chimpanzees 
or porpoises. I would claim that, on our planet, human beings are cur­
rently far beyond any other creatures in the development of the relevant 
features and capacities. I would also claim that at most only a very few 
of our fellow creatures are capable of developing intellectual lives at all 
resembling ours. In sum, I think we have good empirical grounds for 
regarding ourselves as special. 
I do not understand any of the features of consciousness I have pointed 
to well enough to know whether they should be regarded as occurring 
in all degrees of development or whether they are intrinsically "lumpy." 
That is, is it possible for a conscious creature to be just the slightest bit 
self-conscious, or is self-consciousness an all-or-nothing matter? It seems 
implausible to regard self-consciousness as strictly an all-or-nothing mat­
ter, but there may still be some initial threshold of development below 
which there can be no self-consciousness at all. In any event, to the extent 
that the features of consciousness I have pointed to do come in degrees, 
I would concede that different degrees of valuable consciousness may all 
produce valuable complexes with, of course, different degrees of value. 
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So there may be some intrinsic value in the intellectual life of a dog. It 
does not follow, however, that the dog in whose life there is some intrinsic 
value is as valuable as, or has the same "rights" as, a fully developed 
human being. Because there is more good to be achieved by "cultivating" 
the human, the human's needs and interests will tend to prevail. 
So much for my argument about why, and to what extent, humans 
are special. Many environmentalists seem to think that claiming to be 
special can show only that we are arrogant or presumptuous. Paul Taylor 
has recently attempted to show that humans should not be regarded as 
special.16 Taylor's argument is aimed specifically against the claim that 
we are special because we are "rational." That is not exactly my claim, 
but it is close enough to make what he says of interest here. His argument 
goes as follows: We cannot say humans are special just because they are 
more rational than other animals. After all, cheetahs are faster than other 
animals, and eagles see better. If humans are best at one thing, other 
species are best at other things. Nor can we say that being rational is 
better or more important than being fast or far-sighted. Being rational 
has been adaptive for humans and is valued by humans. But cheetahs 
and eagles have taken other routes and value other qualities. 
This does not seem to be an argument at all against a position like 
mine. It may be a useful reminder that we cannot say simply, "Rationality 
is good because that's what we're good at," or "Rationality is valuable 
because that's what we value." But it says nothing against the possibility 
that there is some objective point of view from which rationality does 
actually have an importance which speed and acute vision do not. 
Indeed, Taylor himself seems committed to the existence of such an 
objective point of view. He is one of those who believe that every creature 
has a good of its own. He instructs us that we should respect the goods 
of other creatures. But why? If the speed of the cheetah is good only 
from the cheetah's point of view, as Taylor suggests rationality is good 
only from our human-centered point of view, then why should we respect 
it at all ?  The cheetah's point of view is not ours. In telling us to respect 
the goods of other species, Taylor implicitly assumes both that there is 
a viewpoint "above" all the particular species-centered views and that 
we can adopt that viewpoint. If this synoptic viewpoint exists and is 
accessible to us, why should we not find when we adopt it that our 
capacities have just the special importance I claim ? 
My own view, of course, is that there is a synoptic viewpoint, and that 
it is accessible to us, and that when we adopt it we see not only that 
humans are specially important, but also why. What we see is that humans 
are necessary to the full realization of the "goods" of other species. The 
cheetah's speed is good, but it is not good in itself. It needs to be known 
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by a subject who can know it and take pleasure in it in a sophisticated 
way. The cheetah does not value his speed in the required way. We can 
and should. This is the proper spelling out of the notion that every 
creature has "a good of its own." 
One of the most striking articulations of the claim that humans are 
special comes from none other than Aldo Leopold, who is often thought 
of as concerned only to deflate human pretensions and put us in our 
place. In an essay inspired by a monument to the passenger pigeon, 
Leopold writes: 
For one species to mourn the death of another is a new thing under 
the sun. The Cro-Magnon who slew the last mammoth thought only 
of steaks. The sportsman who shot the last pigeon thought only of 
his prowess. The sailor who clubbed the last auk thought of nothing 
at all. But we, who have lost our pigeons, mourn the loss. Had the 
funeral been ours, the pigeons would hardly have mourned us. In 
this fact, rather than in Mr. DuPont's nylons or Mr. Vannevar Bush's 
bombs, lies objective evidence of our superiority over the beasts . 17  
X .  ON NoT A V O I D I N G  THE PROBLEM, AGAIN 
I am now done with expounding my solution to the problem posed at 
the beginning of this essay. The solution, depending as it does on a 
Moorean view of the good, may seem implausible. Would it be better 
after all just to deny that we have noninstrumental duties of preservation? 
Many philosophers who write about our relationship to nature observe 
that we have intuitions suggesting noninstrumental duties of preservation 
and conclude immediately that some theoretical underpinning for such 
duties must be found. That is not my position. One function of moral 
theory is to account for our intuitions; but another function is to test 
them. If we had a moral theory that was satisfactory, or even reasonably 
satisfactory, in other respects, but that failed to account for our supposed 
duties of preservation, then we would have strong reason for denying 
those duties. 
In truth, however, we have no theory which is even remotely satisfac­
tory in other respects. There was a time when philosophers treated as 
the central question of ethics the question, "What ought I to do with my 
life ?"  I think this is still the central question. But it is a question which 
neither the modern utilitarian nor the modern Kantian (and every popular 
theory is either a utilitarianism or a Kantianism) even attempts to answer. 
The modern utilitarian takes as the good the satisfaction of people's 
preferences, whatever they may be. But this theory of the good does not 
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specify adequately what we should aim at in life, for the simple reason 
that human preferences are not given exogenously. Any individual can 
to some extent control the content of her own preferences. She cannot 
revise them instantaneously by an act of will, but she can act in ways 
which, over time, will create or strengthen some preferences and extin­
guish or weaken others. Even more obviously, the general run of human 
preferences are in large part the result of prior human decisions, by 
families, societies, and polities; and present decisions by families, soci­
eties, and polities affect what people's preferences will be in the future. 
We are therefore inevitably confronted with the question of what our 
preferences ought to be. What ought we to try to bring about that we 
and others prefer? Aside from some observations about the desirability 
of preferences being, so far as possible, well informed and consistent, 
modern utilitarians have nothing to say about this. They cannot have 
anything to say about this without going beyond the claim that the good 
is the satisfaction of preferences. (Benthamite utilitarianism, with its claim 
that the good is a single, homogeneous stuff called "pleasure," is not 
subject to the same criticism. But there are other reasons why Benthamite 
utilitarianism is implausible. One cannot believe after reading the Gorgias 
and the Philebus that pleasure is the good; and one cannot believe after 
reading the Nicomachean Ethics that pleasure is homogeneous.) 
The modern Kantian-and I use the term broadly, to include libertar­
ians as well as liberals-is in no better state. His essential program is to 
carve out for each agent a sphere of autonomy. This may be done (as 
the libertarian does it) by purely negative constraints on how individuals 
may be treated; or it may involve (as it does for most liberals) positive 
prescriptions concerning such things as the distribution of resources. In 
either case, nothing is said about what anyone ought to do with the 
autonomy that has been secured for him. 
If modern moral theory ignores the central question of morality­
"What ought I to do with my life?"-then we need a new moral theory, 
or at least a different theory from the currently popular utilitarianisms 
and Kantianisms, for reasons which go far beyond the desire to justify 
preservationist intuitions on philosophical grounds. It seems to me that 
some theory of the good along the general lines of G. E. Moore's account 
will be necessary to answer the question of what one ought to do with 
one's life. It is a happy accident that such an account also allows us to 
explain duties of preservation which are otherwise inexplicable. (It isn't 
really an accident, of course. Any proper answer to the question of what 
one ought to do with one's life will have to address the general problem 
of man's place in the universe. ) 
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X I .  C O N C L U D I N G  REMARKS 
This has been a long essay, a forest in which we have become preoccupied 
with a number of individual trees. I have two concluding remarks. 
The first remark is by way of summary and emphasis. The main thing 
I set out to do was to construct a theory with two features. On the one 
hand, the theory should generate categorical duties of preservation­
duties that do not depend on instrumental arguments, and, more partic­
ularly, duties that are independent of our changeable needs and prefer­
ences. On the other hand, the theory should be consistent with our belief 
that the existence of value depends on consciousness; the theory should 
avoid ascribing intrinsic value to natural objects indiscriminately. I have 
constructed such a theory. Whether I have made it plausible, or as plau­
sible as the alternatives, the reader must judge. 
The second remark is not central to the present essay, but it is important 
to a correct general understanding of our duties regarding nature. If my 
theory is right, human beings occupy a special role in the universe. We 
are essential to the realization of the most significant values, even those 
involving nonhuman nature. What that means is that all the standard 
instrumental arguments for preservation, if they are sufficiently general, 
retain their full force on my view. "Sufficiently general" instrumental 
arguments are those based on what is essential to human life and general 
well-being, as opposed to what is necessary to satisfy particular, possibly 
valueless, preferences. Thus, although I have been concerned to construct 
a noninstrumental argument for certain conclusions, I have definitely not 
attempted to displace instrumental arguments across the board. It may 
well be that the most important arguments in practice are still instru­
mental. That also accords with common intuitions. 
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